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THE 1980s--DID WE SAVE THE
STOCKHOLDERS WHILE THE
CORPORATION BURNED?
ANDREW G.T. MOORE, H*
I. INTRODUCTION
Throughout the 1980s, the Delaware Supreme Court decided cases in-
volving some of the largest takeovers and mergers in corporate history.
Our decisions served to redefine the role of a director and to usher in a
new era of director responsibility. The far-reaching impact of the court's
decisions has led some to refer to the 1980s as the golden age of corpo-
rate law. However, from what we now know and are learning daily, it
might be more accurate to call it the gold-plated age of corporate law.
And the luster is wearing off.
Companies that first gained national attention as the battles for corpo-
rate control raged in the Delaware courts are once again in the headlines.
This time, however, the headlines read: layoffs, record losses, defaults,
bankruptcy, and pervasive financial manipulation by those on Wall Street
and in Beverly Hills. Recalling the economic history of the 1920s, we
observe, with deep concern for the future, the excesses, scandals, and
ruined reputations spawned by the decade of the eighties. Thus, the
haunting words of George Santayana remind us that: "Progress, far
from consisting in change, depends on retentiveness .... Those who can-
not remember the past are condemned to fulfill it."1
Even in hindsight, the 1980s were an exciting period for the corporate
bar. Struggles for corporate control that began in the early 1980s as an
effort to capitalize on depressed stock prices soon exploded into a take-
over frenzy. With millions to be made in breakups and exorbitant fees,
acquirors and their financial advisors, who cared little or nothing for the
corporation itself, plotted new forms of attack that made virtually any
company a takeover candidate. In an effort to fend off hostile bidders,
both actual and perceived, corporations employed newly devised radical
* Justice, Supreme Court of Delaware.
1. 1 GEORGE SANTAYANA, LIFE OF REASON (ch. xii, FLUX AND CONSTANCY IN HUMAN
NATURE) (1905-06).
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defensive strategies. The players and the playing field appeared to
change on a daily basis.
Although the long-range ramifications of the takeover craze are not
yet known, one thing is clear: the 1980s changed the way American cor-
porations do business. I suspect that the effects of the era have changed
or will change the way in which America looks at corporations.
In retrospect, many ask why this era of mega-mergers happened and
why nothing was done to control events that seemed to be endangering
the entire economy and the livelihood of millions. In order to appreciate
these events, however, it is necessary to understand the environment in
which they occurred.
II. THE 1980S CORPORATE ENVIRONMENT AND
ATTEMPTS AT REGULATION
As we entered the 1980s, stock prices of corporations were underval-
ued, and interest rates began declining. Many of America's largest cor-
porations had little debt and a surplus of cash. In addition, the political
climate was rapidly changing. The election of Ronald Reagan heralded
an atmosphere of free enterprise without any serious threat of govern-
ment intervention. Many potential mergers that predated the Reagan
Administration, both friendly and hostile, foundered on antitrust con-
cerns. In the 1980s, such barriers all but disappeared. The Reagan Ad-
ministration believed that free markets worked best, and that
government should interfere in business and finance as little as possible.
Laissez-faire was the call of the day. No longer was "bigness badness."
No longer was a market defined in terms of American companies com-
peting in the American market. The 1980s marked a change into a new
world market. Accompanying this change was the deregulation of many
industries, including broadcasting, transportation, banking, savings and
loan, and oil and gas. The deregulation allowed for increased competition
and for previously prohibited combinations.
Another major development marking this era of corporate law was the
changing nature of the investor. More than fifty percent of the outstand-
ing shares of Fortune 500 companies were held by institutional investors
with professional portfolio managers. Arbitrageurs amassed huge posi-
tions in potential targets-hoping to put companies "in play." Many
such efforts were intentionally manipulative and illegal. With the chang-
ing investor came a new corporate focus. Success was measured in short-
run returns rather than long-term gains. For the first time, corporations
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were compelled to maximize short-term profitability at the expense of
long-term goals.
With these changes-lower interest rates, a new world market, an al-
tered pattern of stock ownership, a changed political environment, and
rampant misconduct on Wall Street-virtually no company, no matter
how large, was immune as a potential takeover target.
This changing economic and political climate did not go unnoticed. It
became open season on corporations, and acquirors moved in for the kill.
Some of them soon became household names, and corporate manage-
ment ran scared.
To satisfy their seemingly insatiable appetite for the corporate treas-
ury, bidders turned to Michael Milken and his high yield "junk bond"
financing. With access to the junk bond market, it was now possible for
persons with relatively small resources to finance even the largest and
riskiest ventures while investing almost none of their own capital. Theo-
retically, the debt would be paid by selling portions of the acquired cor-
poration, resulting in both profit to the acquiror and a leaner, more
efficient corporation. Realistically, the acquirors and their advisors were
often more concerned with their own financial profits and not with the
corporation being acquired-or with the welfare of its stockholders.
As new takeover techniques developed, the boards of target corpora-
tions were forced to counter with new defenses. Directors began restruc-
turing their companies even before they became a target. Corporations
began acquiring other companies in an effort to consume their excess
capital resources that so invited a hostile takeover. Other responses to a
perceived takeover threat included the adoption of "shark repellents":
classified boards, poison pills, supermajority voting requirements, and
fair price provisions. Terms such as "asset lockups," "crown jewel,"
"white knights," "bear hugs," and "greenmailer" became commonplace.
Such defensive measures, however, posed an inherent conflict of interest
since they also had the effect of entrenching management.
With all of the attention and energy focused on corporate America,
one might conclude that this was a period of significant corporate
growth. I seriously doubt it. Instead, the 1980s marked a period of mas-
sive wealth shifting, but little wealth creation. The "best and the bright-
est" now went to work for investment banking firms; business, as such,
was viewed as pass6. Although bidders and their entourage of advisors
were making billions of dollars, the nagging question arose: was Ameri-
can enterprise selling out its long-term future for short-term gains? Sad-
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dled with huge debts, American corporations found it more difficult to
compete with their cash-rich counterparts in Asia, which were expending
more effort developing new technologies as opposed to developing new
takeover strategies or defenses. Thus the balance of world economic
power was slowly shifting from the West to the East.
Amid this changing takeover environment, many large corporations
ironically turned to Washington for protective federal regulation.
Although many reforms were proposed in the early to mid-1980s, none
would become law.
In February 1983, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)
was directed to submit a proposal on takeover regulation to Congress.
The SEC established a tender offer advisory committee comprised of cor-
porate management, shareholders, market professionals, investment
bankers, and prominent lawyers. The committee recommended numer-
ous changes, but cautioned that "there is insufficient basis for concluding
that takeovers are either per se beneficial or detrimental to the econ-
omy." 2 The SEC reviewed these recommendations and then submitted
its proposals to Congress. In May, 1985, however, the SEC voted unani-
mously not to seek new legislation and withdrew all of its earlier propos-
als for change.3
Offering no support, the White House also believed that there was no
need for additional takeover regulations. In fact, White House econo-
mists claimed that takeovers and corporate restructurings were increas-
ing American productivity. Indeed, according to the President's chief
economist, the only abusive tactics in takeover contests were defensive
measures employed by management of target corporations. What a mar-
velous sequel to "Alice in Wonderland"! Thus, federal regulation of
takeovers was described as "premature, unnecessary and unwise."
4
Given these circumstances, the regulation of corporate takeovers was
left to the Delaware courts. As a result, the Delaware Court of Chancery
and the Delaware Supreme Court were called upon to decide many
unique and difficult legal and economic questions that became (for better
or worse) hallmarks of the era.
2. SEC Advisory Committee on Tender Offers-Report of Recommendations (July 8, 1983),
excerpted in Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 28, at 1375 (July 15, 1983).
3. JOHN BROOKS, THE TAKEOVER GAME 269 (1987).
4. COUNCIL OF ECONOMIC ADvisoRs, 1985 ECONOMIC REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT 216
(1985).
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III. THE CASES
A. Smith v. Van Gorkom 5
Before a certain Delaware Supreme Court decision in 1985, the role of
directors was mostly perfunctory. Rarely did a director challenge man-
agement's initiative or even closely question management on issues com-
ing before the board. In accordance with the theory, known to
academics as structural bias and to others as the "country club" mental-
ity, many directors understood that their duties required only a modicum
of service. The thought of being exposed to millions of dollars in per-
sonal liability rarely seemed a serious threat.
Irving Olds, Chairman of U.S. Steel from 1940 to 1952, is quoted as
saying: "Directors are merely the parsley on the fish." 6 In the 1980s,
that idea underwent a major change.
The watershed of this era of director responsibility was Smith v. Van
Gorkom (also known as the Trans Union case). Van Gorkom involved
the cash-out merger of Trans Union into a corporation owned by the
Pritzker brothers. The Delaware Supreme Court, in a 3-2 decision in
which I joined the majority, held that the directors of Trans Union had
breached their fiduciary duties to their stockholders by the hasty and
uninformed manner in which they irretrievably committed themselves to
the sale of the company.7
Never before had such a judgment been visited upon such prominent
directors of a large corporation. Needless to say, the decision was not
generally well received by the corporate bar.
In large part, however, Van Gorkom is one of the most misunderstood
cases in corporate law. Van Gorkom was not new law. It was the appli-
cation of well-established legal principles to egregious facts. It is said
that the case pushed aside the business judgment rule and a court substi-
tuted its own business judgment for that of the corporation's directors.
That is incorrect. Van Gorkom was much more a case about process in
the takeover environment than anything else. The Court said to direc-
tors that the protection of the business judgment rule is not a birthright
of directors but, rather, is given in return for care, loyalty, and unyield-
ing good faith to the corporation.8
5. 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985).
6. ARTHUR FLEISCHER, JR. ET AL., BOARD GAMES 3 (1988).
7. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 893.
8. Id. at 872.
1992]
Washington University Open Scholarship
282 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
There was one aspect of Van Gorkom that the Court found especially
troublesome. Trans Union's directors were stalwart in their unified de-
fense of what occurred. 9 This position was taken even though it was
obvious that certain directors were more culpable than others, and in the
face of the Court's invitation that they take separate positions with a
clear hint of exoneration for all but the most culpable insiders. Indeed,
one of the directors was ill and did not even attend the meeting at which
the merger was approved. In a way, they were "daring" us to find them
all liable in a strategic maneuver to save certain insiders. In light of our
decision finding all the directors liable, the strategic maneuver to cast
down the gauntlet before the Delaware Supreme Court hardly appears to
have been among the wisest decisions in the annals of corporate America.
The Trans Union case, however, was not the harbinger of director up-
heaval many predicted. Indeed, Van Gorkom provided valuable guid-
ance to directors at a most opportune time-just before the takeover
winds of the 1980s gained hurricane force. If anything, it became the
beacon by which directors, faced with the inherent conflicts imposed by
hostile tender offers, steered their companies through the shoals of either
defensive tactics or auctions intended to maximize shareholder values.
The club-like attitude in the board room gave way, without becoming
unsupportive, to a searching, questioning concern for the merits of cor-
porate actions.
Our opinion in Smith v. Van Gorkom was released on January 29,
1985. Its principles were soon tested in the first major hostile tender offer
case addressed by the Delaware Supreme Court in the 1980s.
B. Unocal 10
On February 14, 1985, Mesa Partners, led by T. Boone Pickens, an-
nounced that it had acquired 7.9 percent of Unocal's stock. Unocal was
one of America's largest oil companies. Although Mesa alleged that it
was acquiring the stock for "investment purposes," it soon became evi-
dent that Unocal was Mesa's next target. Shortly after expressing its
interest in Unocal, Mesa announced a two-tier, front-end-loaded, classi-
cally coercive, bust-up, junk-bond-fueled tender offer. Unocal's board of
9. Indeed, the Court even asked counsel whether there existed a distinction among the mem-
bers of Trans Union's board of directors. Counsel for the directors agreed that there was "none
whatsoever." Id. at 899 (on motions for reargument).
10. Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985).
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directors questioned Mesa's motives and found the offer both inadequate
and coercive.
This was the very sort of takeover device that had caused such a hue
and cry in Congress and before the SEC-and as to which neither body
had done anything. Consequently, Unocal's board rejected Mesa's bid,
and in response offered to repurchase fifty million shares of its own stock
at seventy-two dollars a share, specifically excluding Mesa from its offer.
For the first time, a corporation defending against a hostile takeover
launched its own self-tender and excluded the hostile acquiror.
The Delaware Supreme Court thus had before it issues of vast national
legal and economic import. It was clear that in this context, with the
inherent conflicts faced by the directors, that ordinary principles of busi-
ness judgment were inadequate to decide such issues. Due to this inher-
ent conflict, the Court abandoned traditional concepts of business
judgment, and established two criteria that must be met before the pro-
tection of the business judgment rule will be conferred.
First, directors must show that they had reasonable grounds for believ-
ing that a danger to corporate policy and effectiveness existed." This
burden is satisfied by showing good faith and reasonable investigation.12
Second, the defensive measures must be reasonable in relation to the
threat posed.' 3 This became the test by which all defensive mechanisms
were judged in takeover cases. We also announced for the first time that
in taking such measures the board could consider the interests of the
corporate enterprise, which includes shareholders, as well as various con-
stituencies-creditors, customers, employees, and perhaps even the com-
munity generally. 14 The board also was permitted to consider
inadequacy of the price, nature and timing of the offer, questions of ille-
gality, risk of nonconsummation, quality of securities being offered, and
the bidder's identity and background.15
In addition, with all due respect to the Chicago School, we rejected the
notion that a board should be a passive instrumentality in the face of a
takeover threat. 16
11. Id. at 955.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 955-56.
16. Id. at 954-55 nn.8-10. See also Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506
A.2d 173, 184 n.16 (Del. 1986).
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Another interesting aspect of the Court's decision in Unocal is that it
signaled the end of the coercive, two-tier, junk-bond-fueled tender offer.
The Court's opinion made it clear that such offers, usually couched in
terms of "benefitting" stockholders, were per se coercive and subject to
strong defensive measures.17 The Court's message was not lost on bid-
ders who had popularized the device at the expense of shareholders
whose interests they claimed to serve.
This led to all-cash tender offers financed by the sale of junk bonds to
the public. These bonds were sold to financial institutions that presuma-
bly understood the risks involved. Actually, the bonds were peddled to
institutions drawn in by the high rates, with little regard for the substan-
tial risks being taken and imposed on their own investors. This was ideal
for bidders. They could now structure their bids using publicly issued
junk bonds while engaging in all-cash tender offers whose coercive effect
was considered minimal.
This situation was less than ideal for the U.S. economy. As the junk
bond market began to collapse, it became apparent that many of these
securities had been acquired by insurance companies or savings and loans
that now are suffering unprecedented losses or have already collapsed.
In order to protect depositors, the United States government has been
forced to bail out many insolvent thrifts. Thus, while the raiders and
those encouraging them made billions in the process, substantial risks
and costs of these free-wheeling debacles have been passed to the United
States taxpayers.
C. Revlon 1"
After Unocal, there was concern in the corporate community that di-
rectors, upon perceiving a threat, had unlimited discretion to invoke
whatever defensive tactics they could devise. Soon after Unocal, the bat-
tle for control of Revlon by Pantry Pride and Forstmann Little provided
the Delaware Supreme Court with an opportunity to address this
concern.
The battle began with Pantry Pride's unsolicited bid for Revlon. Not
wishing to sell the company, at least not to Mr. Perleman of Pantry
Pride, and perceiving a threat, Revlon's board adopted a poison pill and
other defensive measures. The Delaware Supreme Court found these
17. Unocal, 493 A.2d at 956.
18. Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986).
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board actions to be consistent with the Unocal standards. 19
However, as the battle intensified, so did Revlon's defenses. As Pantry
Pride increased its bid, Revlon sought a white knight. It found one in
Forstmann Little. In consideration of a bid one dollar per share greater
than Pantry Pride's latest but admittedly not final offer, Revlon's board
agreed effectively to stop the bidding. Forstmann was given an asset
lock-up option for two of Revlon's divisions and guaranteed a substantial
break-up fee if the transaction did not occur. In addition, Revlon's board
agreed not to "shop" the company.
The Court found that when Revlon's board began to negotiate with
Forstmann, the sale of the company became inevitable and their respon-
sibilities changed. Unlike Unocal, one thing was clear: the company was
for sale. At this point, defensive measures became moot and the direc-
tors' role changed from defenders of the corporate bastion to auctioneers
charged with getting the best price for the stockholders.20 Viewed in this
light, we found that Revlon's board effectively "stopped the show" pre-
maturely and that the directors breached their fiduciary duties to the
stockholders.21
Purporting to rely on Unocal's reference to various constituencies, the
directors argued that Forstmann's offer benefitted Revlon's note holders,
which had the additional effect of protecting the directors from potential
personal liability to those creditors. In rejecting the directors' argu-
ments, we observed that when giving consideration to other constituen-
cies there must be rationally related benefits accruing to the
stockholders.22 Without this nexus, such actions by the directors violate
their duties of loyalty and care. This principle distinguishes Delaware
law from so many of the new antitakeover "other constituencies" stat-
utes, through which directors are statutorily permitted to breach their
most fundamental fiduciary duties by totally disregarding the interests of
shareholders in favor of the interests of other constituencies.
Revlon did not, however, answer the often subtle questions-when is a
company for sale, and when do the directors' responsibilities shift to
those of "auctioneers"? Was any transaction that invited an unwanted
participant now going to result in a fire sale to the highest bidder? The
answer, if it ever really came, was not to come for several years.
19. Id. at 180-81.
20. Id. at 182.
21. Id. at 182-84.
22. Id. at 182-83.
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D. Time- Warner23
The responsibilities of directors faced with a potential change-of-con-
trol transaction established in Van Gorkom, Revlon, and Unocal were
further clarified in the friendly transaction between Time, Inc. and
Warner Communications.
The circumstances leading up to the Time-Warner transaction were
much different from either Revlon or Unocal. Time's board began con-
sidering expanding Time's operations into the entertainment industry as
early as 1983. To accomplish this, Time established a special committee
of executives to consider and propose corporate strategies for the 1990s.
The committee prepared a "comprehensive long-term planning docu-
ment" that included a reference to, and a description of, Warner as a
potential merger or acquisition candidate. Following considerable re-
search, debate, and two years of negotiations, Time's board finally agreed
to a merger with Warner in March 1989.
Upon learning of the friendly merger between Time and Warner, Para-
mount announced an all-cash offer for Time at $175 per share. Time's
board rejected the offer as inadequate. Paramount countered by raising
its bid to $200 per share. Once again, the board rejected the offer as
inadequate. In further response to Paramount's unsolicited offer, Time's
board changed the structure of the merger with Warner from a stock
swap to a cash offer. This response eliminated the necessity of a share-
holder vote, thereby allowing Time to pursue its long-range plans.
In response to Time's defensive actions, Paramount asked the Dela-
ware Court of Chancery to enjoin the proposed merger. The injunctive
relief was based on both Revlon and Unocal.
Paramount initially argued that once Time's board agreed to a merger
with Warner, it effectively put the company up for sale. Therefore, under
Revlon, it breached its fiduciary duties by not maximizing shareholder
value. However, throughout the merger negotiations, Time steadfastly
maintained that it was not for sale. The Court held that, generally speak-
ing, there are two circumstances that require the board to act as an auc-
tioneer: 1) when the corporation initiates the bidding process, seeking to
sell itself or to effect a reorganization involving a change in control or a
clear breakup of the company; and 2) when, in response to a bidder's
offer, a target abandons its long-term strategy and seeks an alternative
23. Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time, Inc., 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1989).
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transaction that also involves the breakup of the company.24 Finding
neither of these situations to exist, we held that the board's reaction to
Paramount's offer was merely a defensive response and not an abandon-
ment of Time's continued existence.25 Therefore, the action of Time's
board should be evaluated under the standards of Unocal rather than
those of Revlon.
Turning to the Unocal claim, the Delaware Supreme Court found that
Time's board properly perceived Paramount's uninvited offer as a threat
to the corporate enterprise.26 Paramount argued that since its offer was
all cash, the only reasonable "threat" that could be perceived was inade-
quate value. Indeed, this assertion found support in some Chancery
Court decisions.27
The Delaware Supreme Court rejected Paramount's argument and re-
iterated its belief that when evaluating the threat posed by a tender offer,
a variety of factors other than price could be considered. For example,
Time perceived as a threat the possibility that a shareholder would
tender into Paramount's cash offer in ignorance of the strategic benefit
that Time's combination with Warner might produce.2" It is important
to note that in Time, we were not faced with a hip-pocket plan concocted
at the eleventh hour. Rather, Time was able to document a long-term
strategy originating years before the contested maneuvers occurred. Cer-
tainly the legitimacy of a long-range plan is important when determining
whether a board reasonably views and reacts to an acquiror as a threat.
E. Review
Obviously, the Court played a significant role in the battles for corpo-
rate control. What is not clear, however, is the nature of that role: did
the decisions of the Court feed the takeover frenzy or serve to limit it?
There is no easy answer to this question because it is necessary to un-
derstand the type of controversy that typically was before the Court. We
did not approach cases with the question of whether to allow the corpo-
ration to continue in its present form or to permit someone else to ac-
quire the company. Typically, either management or a third-party had
made an offer in response to an initial offer. Thus, the question before
24. Id. at 1150.
25. Id. at 1150-51.
26. Id. at 1153.
27. See, eg., City Capital Assocs. v. Interco, Inc., 551 A.2d 787 (Del. Ch. 1988).
28. Time, Inc., 571 A.2d at 1153.
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the Court was whether the directors acted properly in accepting or re-
jecting the competing offers. Regardless of the Court's decision, the re-
sulting company would be dramatically different.
Although the Court could not stop a corporation from incurring huge
debts, it could try to ensure that the directors acted in the shareholders'
best interests. While sale of the corporation to the highest bidder satis-
fied the director's fiduciary duties, the stark fact often remained that the
resulting corporation was so highly leveraged that its future was ques-
tionable. As long as the directors adhered to their fiduciary duties, it
would have been most inappropriate for any court to intrude upon a
board's business decision. No court has a role in disciplining directors
for the proper exercise of business judgment, even if it turns out to be
wrong.
However, based on the nature of the transactions before us and the
scope of our review, we did establish the rules by which the battles were
fought.
IV. CONCLUSION
As we consider these matters in retrospect, it is rather staggering to
realize that profound changes have occurred. Now we are paying the
price for what happened to companies in the 1980s-all in the name of
saving them from bidders who could easily muster the financial resources
to put virtually any company in play. There is mounting evidence that
the actions of bidders and their investment bankers were not in pursuit of
the pious claim of returning value to the shareholders. It appears that
frequently they were the naked display of awesome financial power fu-
eled by greed and the basest of motives.
Clearly, we are left with many unanswered and dangerous questions
with heavy portent for the nineties: did the intense focus on next quar-
ter's earnings, at the expense of meeting competition and developing and
selling a product, so divert American business that it suffered a disas-
trous decline in world markets? Is the efficient market theory really
valid, or is it the old, discredited, predepression concept of laissez-faire
trooped out in new colors? Did courts lend balance to an otherwise run-
away situation, or, according to their critics, abandon restraint to inter-
fere either with the operations of a free market or the proper business
decisions of corporate management?
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We now have time to reflect on these questions. One can only hope
that, as we try to discern the solutions, those who come after us will not
have to relearn either the questions or their answers.
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